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THE CLOSE CORPORATION AND THE LAW
CARLOS

D.

ISRAELS

Lawyers have long recognized, in practice if not in theory, a distinction
between two types of corporations termed-for lack of more precise appellations-the "close corporation" and the "public issue corporation." The
terms are inaccurate because a "close corporation" is not necessarily a small
enterprise nor even one having comparatively few stockholders and a "public
issue corporation" has not necessarily been financed by public sale of its
securities.
What then is the distinction? Arbritrary definitions based on financial
size or number of investors have been suggested.' Obviously, however, the
distinction cannot accurately be so expressed. A ten million dollar enterprise
may as easily be a "family affair" as a ten thousand dollar enterprise.
Foreign statutes generally set up a special type of corporation, e.g., the
English "private company", the French "Soci&6 . R6sponsabilit6 Limit6'
and the German "G.m.b.H." which are contrasted with the "public company,"
the "Soci6t6 Anonyme" and the "Aktsiengesellschaft" respectively. It has
been argued that the distinction made in the foreign statutes affords a useful
analogy for American legislation. However, closer examination of those
statutes clearly indicates the broad purpose merely to distinguish between
publicly financed and privately financed enterprises, exempting the latter
from the rather strict requirements for registration, publication of financial
data, and the like, imposed upon the former.
In the economic sense in which the term is used in the United States, a
"close corporation" is an enterprise in corporate form in which management
and ownership are substantially identical. As a result of that identity the
participants consider themselves "partners" and seek to conduct the corporate affairs to a greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership.
Implementation or frustration of that desire has given rise to most of the
litigated cases in the United States.
Litigation has centered about the attempts of participants in close corporations generally occupying not only the capacity of shareholder bnt also
those of director and officer to induce the courts to recognize private agreements between them which are in derogation of the statutory scheme of
corporate government. To say the least, the courts have not been consistent
1E.g. Weiner, Proposing a New York Close CorporationLaw, 28
(1943).
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in their attitudes. They have recognized or refused to recognize the validity
of such agreements on varying grounds from case to case. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc.,2 decided in 1945
by a majority of four judges to three, brought the problem to a head in
New York. Two shareholders, one holding one-third and the other twothirds of the outstanding shares of the corporation, agreed at the instance
of the minority shareholder to the following four by-laws, each requiring
unanimity:
1. for all shareholders' resolutions;
2. for all elections of directors;
3. for all directors' resolutions; and
4. for all amendments to the by-laws.
They also agreed not to vote their shares against each other and if they
failed to reach accord, not to vote at all. A year later the majority shareholder called a special meeting to annul the four by-laws. The minority
shareholder thereupon sued in equity to have the by-laws declared valid and
to enjoin the corporation from doing anything inconsistent therewith. The
majority of the Court of Appeals held the first three by-laws invalid as violative of the statutory scheme of corporate government, particularly Sections
27 and 28 of the General Corporation Law and Section 55 of the Stock Corporation Law. Only the fourth by-law was sustained. The dissenting judges argued vigorously for judicial recognition of the distinction between the close
corporation and the public issue corporation, saying in fact that so long as no
public or creditor interest would have been prejudiced by recognizing the
validity of the agreement between the two shareholders as embodied in the
by-laws, their contract should be enforced at least as between the individuals.
The decision aroused considerable comment because it could be interpreted
as overruling an earlier important case, 3 which had caused New York lawyers
to believe that .agreements between the participants of a close corporation,
provided all shareholders were parties to them, would probably be sustained
in the New York courts despite the fact that, strictly construed, they might
violate the statutory scheme. The matter was studied by the New York
Law Revision Commission and has now been clarified by the 1948 Legislature. Chapter 862 of the New York Laws of 1948, effective September 1,
1948, adds a new Section 9 to the Stock Corporation Law, reading as follows:
"Provisions of certificates of incorporation; requirement of greater
2294 N. Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945).
3
Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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than majority or plurality vote of directors or shareholders; restrictions.
1. The certificate of incorporation as originally filed, or as amended
by certificate filed pursuant to law, may contain provisions specifying any
or all of the following:
(a) that the number of directors who shall be present at any meeting
in order to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business or
of any specified item of business shall be such number greater than a
majority as may be specified in such certificate;
(b) that the number of votes of directors that shall be necessary
for the transaction of any business or of any specified item of business
at any meeting of directors shall be such number greater than a majority
as may be specified in such certificate;
(c) that the number of shares of any class having voting power, the
holders of which shall be present in person or represented by proxy at
any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any
business or of any specified item of business shall be a number greater
than the majority or plurality prescribed by law in the absence of such
provision;
(d) that the number of votes or consents of the holders of shares of
any class of stock having voting power that shall be necessary for the
transaction of any business or of any specified item of business, including
amendments to the certificate of incorporation, or the giving of any consent, shall be a number-greater than the.majority or plurality prescribed
by law in the absence of such provision;
2. (a) A requirement for a quorum, vote or consent of directors
or shareholders, which is invalid except for the authorization therefor
granted by this section, shall not be valid hereunder unless (i) it appears'
in the certificate of incorporation as originally filed or as amended by
certificate filed pursuant to law; (ii) notice of its existence appears
plainly on the face of all stock certificates; and (iii) it specifies a period
no longer than ten years for its duration.
(b) A certificate filed pursuant to law containing a requirement
authorized by this section shall be subscribed and acknowledged by every
subscriber of the certificate of incorporation and every subscriber to
stock if no stock has been issued, or in person or by proxy by the holders
of record of all outstanding shares of the corporation. Such certificate
may be amended at any time in the same manner or in such manner
as may be provided in the certificate.
3. At the expiration of any requirements specified pursuant to subdivision one of this section, such requirements may be renewed from
time to time for further periods, not exceeding ten years each upon
compliance with the provisions of this section.
4. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the power
of a court of equity to decree a dissolution in a proper case."
The purpose of this article is to survey the problem of the governance of
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the close corporation from the standpoint of the participants in the enterprise,
as it existed under the leading cases in New York and in other states prior
to the new statute; to discuss the theory of the new statute; and to essay
some prognostication as to how some of the practical problems which confront
counsel for such an enterprise have been and may now be dealt with. 4
It will be seen at once that the statute does not speak in terms of close
corporations. It sets forth no definition but is applicable to any stock corporation. This was done in recognition of the historical fact that no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears ever to have been
worked out, a fact which itself has led to some of the confusion in the cases,
springing from the willingness or unwillingness of particular courts to grant
legal recognition to the clearly separate economic concept of th6 close corporation. The conflict is nowhere better illustrated than in the two Be.intendi
opinions; the majority opinion refusing to let the facts dictate a modification
of the statutory scheme of corporate government; the minority arguing for
a pragmatic flexibility which would clearly indicate a different result because
Kenton Hotel, Inc. was actually a close corporation. 5
Therefore the Law Revision Commission rejected the idea of arbitrary
definition of a close corporation and sought to meet the problem in pragmatic
terms, adopting a solution which while theoretically applicable to any corporation would not as a practical matter be resorted to by any except a
genuine close corporation.
Against this background, we seek first to analyze the objective of the
participants in a close corporation with respect to its scheme of government.
The Objective
The objective of the participants in a close corporation is to equate the
scheme of governance of their enterprise to that of a partnership. The
extent to which that objective has been "attained or has failed of attainment
in particular instances has depended often on the court's view as to the
existence or non-existence of a basic public policy; viz., limited liability is
a privilege granted by the state, for which the participants must pay the
price, that price being submission to the statutory scheme of majority or
4

No attempt will be made to analyze or even to cite all of the cases; those discussed
have been selected because they present problems which, in the writer's view, are typical.
5This and many other observations here made find their origin in the Acr, REcomMENDATION AND STUDY OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION WITH RESPEcr TO CLOSE
CORPORATIONs, LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT (1948) No. 65 K, on which the writer served
as Research Consultant.
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representative corporate government. Thus the court in the Benintendi case
held by-law number 3 (requiring unanimity for all directors' action) "intrinsically unlawful because it contravenes an essential part of state policy
as expressed in the Stock Corporation Law" ;O while the dissenting judges
' '7
thought "There is here no question of public policy.
Existence of the policy is rationalized on the basis of legislative (or perhaps
judicial) abhorrence of a deadlock, the Court of Appeals majority quoting
an English decision to the effect that "prima facie in all acts done by a
corporation, the major number must bind the lesser, or else differences could
8
never be determined."
As we shall see below, this argument is somewhat of an overstatement.
The Equation
Apart from the new statute, let us line up the elements of the equation
between the partnership and corporate schemes of government. Under either
form the participants in a "family" enterprise seek:
Veto powers as to admission of a new participant,Veto powers in matters of day to day administration;
Veto powers as to basic structural changes;
The ability to freeze particular individuals into jobs or other emoluments; and perhaps
V. A way out in the event of deadlock.

I.
II.
III.
IV.

I.

Veto Powers as to Admission of a New Partner

The right to veto the admission of a new member of the firm is basic to
the partnership concept. No one may become a partner without the consent
of the existing partners, and a partner cannot convey his interest in the
firm to another and give his assignee any of the rights of partnership except
the right to receive his assignor's share of the profits. 9
By contrast, the purchaser of corporate shares, hether from the corporation itself or from others, immediately becomes a participant in more
than the profits of the enterprise. The very status of shareholder carries
6294 N. Y. 112, 117, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 830 (1945) ; accord, Jack-son v. Hooper, 76 N. J.
Eq. 185, 74 At. 130 (1909); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
7294 N.Y. 112, 129, 60 N. E. 24 829, 837 (1945) ; accord, Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214
Ill.
589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905) ; Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343 (1926).

8294 N. Y. 112, 119, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
9N. Y. PARTNEaSHIP LAW § 53. Nor does the assignment relieve the assignor of
liability for federal income taxes on subsequently accruing profits. Rossmore v. Anderson, 1 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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with it not only an interest in the earnings but almost without exception a
right to participate in the distribution of assets on dissolution and some voice
in management through the exercise of voting power. While the holders of
a particular class of shares may be excluded from voting for the election of
directors and even on most of the extraordinary matters which under the
statutory scheme require shareholders' votes or c6nsents, practically all of
the statutes in some manner preserve the right of each shareholder to vote
on a proposal which would adversely affect his vital property interests. 10
The extent to which a new participant becomes ,a "partner" is of course dependent primarily upon the proportion of the voting power which he can
purchase. Assuming that he has purchased shares entitled to vote for the
election of directors, he still cannot assure himself of election to the board
under ordinary voting, unless he purchases the majority of the shares; under
cumulative voting, unless he purchases at least the electoral quotient;" or
where voting is by classes, unless he has purchased a majority of the shares
of a particular class. As to extraordinary matters, the situation is the same.
In New York, for instance, the new participant cannot control the decision
to sell all or substantially all of the assets unless he purchases two-thirds
of the shares, 12 but with one share more than one-third he acquires a veto
power over the decision to sell or not to sell. Possibly, also, the new participant's objective to assure himself a place on a five man board under
cumulative. voting by the purchase of 21% of the outstanding shares might
be defeated by a majority shareholder's decision to reduce the number of
the board from five to four or three; and his objective to obtain a veto
power over a sale of assets by purchase of 34' of the outstanding shares
might be defeated by the sale of new shares to others unless he is protected
by preemptive rights and can afford to exercise them.
Certainly under the conventional corporate scheme no individual shareholder may forbid another to convey his shares, no matter how unfriendly
he may believe the intended conveyee to be. An agreement not to convey
one's holdings for a given period is invalid as a restraint on the power of
alienation, but from this has come the conventional restriction on transfer
and cross-option agreement, giving the corporation, the other participants,
or both, the option to purchase any shares at a calculated or arbitrated price
prior to their offer to a stranger.1
'OSee N. Y. STOCK CoRpoRATioi LAW § 51.
11E.g., where there is a three-member board of directors, more than a 331/3% of
the12shares entitled to vote.
N. Y. STOCK CORPORATiON LAW § 20. IsThe validity of such arrangements is unquestioned. Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale,
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Obviously, however, the restriction on transfer does not accomplish the
complete equation. Nor does the new statute in any way change this situation.
If the newcomer can purchase a sufficient weight of shares after the crossoption agreement has been complied with, he may become pro tanto a
"partner," unless the scheme of corporate governance set up by the certificate
of incorporation and the by-laws permits the cutting down of his effectiveness
in some such manner as above indicated.
Once the purchase has been accomplished, the new participant is in the
same position toward his co-participants as he would have been had he
joined with them in organizing the corporation in the first instance.
II.

Veto Powers in Matters of Day to Day Administration

As to the partnership, the law is clear. The partners by their agreement
may provide for simple or qualified majority or for unanimity as they may
please. In the corporate scheme the problem has more than one facet. The
statutes contemplate a hierarchy under which decisions as to day to day
administrative matters are to be made not by the participants as such, bul
by the directors and the officers. They contemplate majority control:
(a) by the shareholders as to the personnel of the board;
(b) by the board as to its own acts, including the personnel of the
officers.
Various devices for restricting the power of the majority shareholders as
to board personnel have been availed of, and are generally upheld. Cumulative voting is clearly effective if the holding of the individual participant
meets the electoral quotient, subject only to the difficulties inherent in the
power of the shareholders by majority action to change the number of
directors or to issue new shares.
At least the first difficulty can be insured against in New York under
Rippi v. U. S. Woven Label Co.1 4 which upheld the validity of a requirement
of unanimous shareholders' consent to change the number of directors' 5 and
was specifically distinguished by the court in the Benintendi case.16 On the
other hand, where all of the existing shares are of a single class, it seems
that the Benintendi case 17 would condemn a requirement of unanimity or
107 Misc. 646, 177 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Sup. Ct. 1919). However the share certificates
must be appropriately stamped as required by the UNIFORM STocK TRASSFER AcT § 15
(N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW % 176).
14205 N. Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855 (1912).
15As distinct from the personnel of the board. As to this last problem cf. In re
Boulevard Theatre Co., 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921).
16294 N. Y. 112, 119, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
'7By its holding as to by-laws Number 1 and Number 3.
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qualified majority for the creation of new shares or the sale of authorized
but unissued shares. Thus, unless preemptive rights or the so-called "rule
of equitable contribution" (which merely requires sale at a fair price):"
afford protection, there may be none.
Division of the shares into two or more classes may, however; produce
a somewhat different result. This device is often resorted to, with the principal distinction between the classes being that each class of shares is entitled
to elect a specified number of directors or a specified proportion of the board.
Provided that the votes or consents of the holders of a majority of each
class of shares are required for amendment of the certificate of incorporation
or the by-laws, the number of directors could not be increased, nor could
new shares be authorized except with such consents. 19 Classification of
shares appears to be the best method so far developed to assure continued
representation of all interests on the board. The new statute by its terms
20
does not affect this device.
Voting trusts also are recognized by the statutes, subject, in New York
and Delaware for example, to a ten-year limitation. A single voting trustee
may of course vote all the deposited shares, and two or more trustees may
be required by the agreement to act unanimously or by simple or qualified
majority. Possibly the agreement might require the trustees to vote for
named individuals, and in the writer's view such a provision should be enforceable subject to the trustees' right to show that to so vote would be a
breach of fiduciary duty (e.g., that the named individual had become a lunatic
or been convicted of a crime or had otherwise become disqualified).21
Several of the decided cases have involved agreements among the participants to elect each other as directors. Usually the validity of that particular
agreement has not been a serious issue, but specific dicta seem to leave no
22
doubt that it is valid.
'8 See Israels, Problems of Par and No Par Shares: A Reappraisal,47 COL. L. REv.
1279,
1281 (1947).
19 N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 51 would appear to authorize this type of "class
voting" as well as the exclusion of any particular class from voting for directors or
on any proposal except one which would further limit its own voting power or change
its20preferences or priorities.
For an example which carried this device to the extent of creating four separate
classes of shares, primarily for the purpose of assuring to the holders of each class
the right to elect one of four directors, see Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 297 N. Y. 174, 77 N.E. 2d 633 (1948).
21Cf. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N.E. 2d 234 (1934), discussed infra.
22
The whole line of leading New York cases contains such dicta, e.g., Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323,
189 N.E. 2d 234 (1934), supra note 21; Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
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Why then is not such an agreement the simplest solution? Obviously it
would be if it were clear that it is binding on the corporation and that an
election at which votes were cast in breach of it would be set aside. That
issue arose directly in the important case of Ringling v. Ringling Bros. B. &
B. Combined Shows.2 3 Here two sisters whose combined votes could elect

five out of seven directors under cumulative voting had agreed to vote their
shares alike or, if they failed to agree, as a named individual should direct.
They consulted the individual. One sister followed his instructions. The
other did not. As a result, the brother named four directors and the sisters
three. The Chancery Court ordered a new election. On appeal the Supreme
Court cancelled the effectiveness of the votes of the disobedient sister, but
otherwise upheld the validity of the election, with the result that the corporation had only six directors for the year 1946, three named by the sisters
and three by the brother. The case had many technical aspects under Delaware law, e.g., whether the agreement contemplated the separation of voting
power from the shareholding, an agreement to agree, or an agreement to
arbitrate.2 4 But in the writer's view its most important feature is that it
allowed the actual election, the personnel of the board itself, to be affected
by a private agreement between shareholders to which the corporation was
not a party. Contrast this with the Benintendi case where the court struck
down by-law number 2 (requiring unanimity for the election of directors),
and an earlier case cited as authority for that holding,2 both of which go on
the theory that such a by-law is repugnant to Section 55 of the Stock Corporation Law, providing that directors shall be chosen "by a plurality of the
votes at such election." How would the Ringling case have been 'decided in
New York after an election under Sections 47 and 49 of the Stock Corporation Law? The only right to challenge a shareholder's vote under these
statutes is based on his not being a shareholder of record or his duly authorized proxy. Granted that the agreement-construed as an agreement to
arbitrate-would be specifically enforceable in New York, and that its breach
might be enjoined in advance of the casting of the vote, the writer suggests
that the case would again pose for a New York court the question of
whether or not to recognize that this was a close corporation and thus hold
641 (1936), supra note 2. Nor does the majority opinion in the'Benintendi case appear
inconsistent on this point. The Illinois and New Jersey cases, cited supra notes 6 and
7, are in accord. The point is not discussed in Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va..327, 31 S.E.
2d 893 (1944).
2249 A. 2d 603 (Del. Ch. 1946), aff'd, 53 A. 2d 141 (Del. 1947).
24
This would be unenforceable specifically inDelaware.
25
, 1 re Boulevard Theatre Co., 231 N.Y. 612, 132 N.E. 909 (1921).
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that the shareholders and the corporation should be bound by the agreement
regardless of the letter of the statute, or to refuse to set aside the election
or modify its results.
Agreements among participants in close corporations whereby they seek
veto powers over matters of day to day administration clearly within the
statutory competence of the board of directors have been almost universally
struck down by the courts. The one exception is with respect to the removal
of individuals from particular jobs (discussed under IV below). By-law
number 3 in the Benintendi case required unanimity for all directors' action.
The court condemned it as inconsistent with Sections 27 and 28 of the General Corporation Law, construing those sections as requiring that a quorum
of the board be not more than a majority and possibly also that the act of
a majority of a quorum should be the act of the board. Where the earlier
New York cases infringe on this area their results are entirely consistent.
Under a dictum in Mansmo. v. Curtis2 6 an agreement among shareholders to
elect particular officers is not objectioniable. However, the result of the case
was to strike down a contract under which the corporation's affairs were
to be administered by a named individual without supervision by the board
of directors or the president. A dictum in the majority opinion .in McQuade
27
v. Stoneham would hold an agreement to elect particular officers invalid
Lehman, J. dissented, referring inter alia to Manson v. Curtis on this point.
Clark v. Dodge2 s again contains a dictum to the effect that the shareholders may agree as to officer personnel, but the office in question was that
of "general manager" and the court emphasized that the job was to be
retained only during good behavior. It was said that the restraint, if any,
on directors' discretion was "harmless." The most recent New York case,
Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton New Brunswick Theatres Ca., 29 involved a contract whereby B. F. Keith Co., holding Class A-1 and Class A-2 shares
entitled to elect one director each, was to designate the management and
control the policies of the corporation, despite the fact that others held
Class B and Class C shares, each also entitled to elect one director. It was
further provided that if the majority of the Class B and Class C shareholders wanted a change of management, the question must be arbitrated.
The Court of Appeals struck down the agreement as an attempt to sterilize
the board of directors, and refused to uphold it as a management contract
N.E. 559 (1918).
MCQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N. E. 2d 234 (1934).
28294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945).
29
Supra note 20.
26223 N.Y. 313, 119
27
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binding on the corporation. Pragmatically the decision is a particularly interesting one since it creates, not breaks, a potential deadlock, but the theory
is completely consistent with that of the earlier cases.
The cases in other states are all, of the same tenor. In Jackson v. Hooper3"
a New Jersey court refused to interfere with corporate administration by
directors who were intended to be dummies but who, when the two sharebolders quarreled, chose sides between them. In Kaplan v. Block3' a Virginia court struck down an agreement requiring ratification by shareholders
for the validity of directors' action.
Under some statutes, it seems clear that unanimity or qualified majority
32
may be required for directors' action. The Illinois Business Corporation Act
specifically permits such a requirement to be inserted in the certificate of
incorporation. So also does the new New York statute which, within the
limitations it contains, has clearly overruled the Benintendi decision as to bylaw number 3 and opened the way for imposing a type of veto power over
day to day administrative matters which was not available in New York
before its enactment.
III.

Veto Powers as to Basic Structural Changes

Here again the partnership scheme is simple and uncomplicated. Decisions
rest with the partners who act or fail to act with whatever consequences
their agreement dictates. The corporate problem is much more complex.
The statutes provide for shareholders' action in specific respects, e.g., for
amendment of the certificate of incorporation, including the authorization
of additional shares, reclassification of shares, reduction of capital, etc., and
also under many statutes (those of New York included) for the mortgage or
sale of any substantial property. The origin of these provisions is relevant.
Historically such steps could not be taken without the consent of all parties
33
to the corporate contract, i.e., the holders of 100% of the shares.
The various statutory provisions are thus, in effect, permissive, granting
to the majority a power it did not previously have, e.g., the power to bind
the minority to an amendment of the certificate of incorporation. Logically,
therefore, it might be argued that a particular corporation or group of shareholders could validly reject the proffered freedom of action. The Delaware
3076 N. J. Eq. 185, 74 At. 130 (1909). A New Jersey corporation was involved
here, but the controlling statute was similar to § 27 of the General Corporations Law.
Va. 327, 31 S. E. 2d 893 (1944).
331183
2
1LL. Bus. CoRe. AcT § 6.37.
3
3 See Breslav v. N. Y. & Queens Elec. L. & P. Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y.
Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936); aff'd, 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E. 2d 708 (1937).
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Corporation Law 34 seems to proceed on this theory in permitting the certificate of incorporation to require a greater majority for shareholders' action
than the statute specifies. Presumably a requirement of unanimity would
be valid under these provisions. In New York, however, the courts appear
to have rejected this line of reasoning. True, by-law number 4 in the Benintendi case (requiring unanimity for amendment of the by-laws) was sustained, but the statute does not specifically provide how by-laws may be
amended. The Ripin and Boulevard Theatre cases sustained limitations on
the power of the majority to amend the certificate of incorporation as to the
number of directors as valid under Section 13 of the General ' Corporation
Law. However, the decision as to by-law number 1 in the Benintendi case
(unanimity required for all shareholders' resolutions) makes clear that at
least where the restriction on the power of the statutory majority is phrased
in all-inclusive terms, it is invalid.
Where there is more than one class of shares, the situation may be different. We have referred above to Section 51 of the Stock Corporation Law
and its authorization of class voting. The purpose of this statute was obviously to permit the creation of one or more classes of shares which could
be denied any voting power in the election of directors and in various types
of extraordinary action. The exclusion is effective except in the cases specified in Section 51 where the proposed action %vould adversely affect the.
preferences, priorities or voting powers of the excluded class of shares.
Under these or similar provisions in other statutes it has become common
practice in public issue corporations having senior security issues such as
preferred shares, to give the senior issues some form of veto power not only
over extraordinary action which under the statute is within the shareholders'
orbit (e.g., the placing of a mortgage) but also over matters ordinarily within
the purview of board action, e.g., the declaration of dividends out of paid-in
or capital surplus as distinct from earned surplus. In some instances percentages higher than the statutory majorities are specified. No such case has
yet been tested in the courts. However, at least so far as such provisions
require clas§ voting by statutory majorities on matters within the satutory
sphere of shareholders' action, Section 51 would seem clearly to validate
them in New York. Where qualified majorities are required, or where the
matters to be passed on are ordinarily within the competence of the directors
there may be some doubt. 35
34

DFL. CoRP. LAW §§ 2 (5) and 17.
35Cf. Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S. E. 2d 893 (1944), where the court struck
down a requirement of shareholder ratification for the validity of directors' action.
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As to close corporations, Section 51 would seem to afford some latitude
to produce the desired veto powers by the rather complicated method of clas,sification of shares without resort to the new statute or subjection to its
technical requirements.
IV.

Freezing Individuals into Jobs or Other Emoluments

As to this also, clearly partners may agree, and in the corporate scheme
the courts have been more sympathetic toward the individual whose status
is sought to be changed than in paying strict adherence to the hierarchy of
corporate government.
While the Kaplan, Mansmo and McQuade cases each sustained removals
from office in breach of shareholders' agreements for retention, the two
Illinois cases 36 and, in New York, Clark v. Dodge37 and Matter of Buckley s
appear to *sustain agreements not to remove officers. In the McQuade case
the actual result was dictated largely if not entirely by the fact that McQuade,
having become a city magistrate, was probably disqualified by statute from
continuing to serve as paid treasurer of the New York Giants. By the same
token, the defendants, being merely majority shareholders, would have
risked personal liability at the suit of the minority who were not parties to
the agreement by continuing McQuade in office. This risk the court declined
to put them to.
The extent to which the Benintendi decision as to by-law number 3 and
the Long Park case8 9 overrule Clark v. Dodge or Matter of Buckley is difficult
to determine. Here again the court struck down restrictions on the powers
of the board phrased in general and all-inclusive terms.
Apart from the new statute then, it may still be possible for all the shareholders of a close corporation to contract as in Clark v. Dodge against the
removal of a named official during the continuance of their shareholding and
during his good behavior. However, the conventional employment contract
is probably a more useful tool. It is not necessary to confuse corporate office
with executive function. It is entirely unobjectionable to have the corporation
(particularly when all shareholders specifically consent) enter into a five to
ten year agreement to employ X at a stated salary, providing that X shall
serve "subject to the control of the board of directors" 40 and, if elected to
86

Supra note 7. Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ili.
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that office, shall also serve as president or vice president, as the case may
be, without additional compensation. To make assurance doubly sure it can
be provided that even though X should not be elected to office in any year
during the term of his employment, his compensation shall not therefore be
reduced.
Under the new statute it can be provided during the ten-year period that
the removal, change of salary, or election of any officer shall require unanimity
or qualified majority.
V. The Way Out of a Deadlock
Article 6 of the Uniform Partnership Law 41 clearly contemplates that dissolution of the firm may be the consequence of deadlock regardless of the
fact that the term of the partnership agreement may not have expired. Dis43
42
solution may ensue by mutual agreement, by the will of a single partner
or by the court at the suit of any partner on the grounds, inter alia, that
another partner has been guilty of "such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business"'44 or "so conducts himself in matters
relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in partnership with him."45
The procedure for dissolution of a New York corporation is governed by
Article 9 of the General Corporation Law. Section 103 specifically contemplates dissolution when the shareholders or directors are deadlocked "unless
the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides." The majority shareholders may direct dissolution, without judicial proceedings, and the directors
may apply for dissolution under judicial supervision regardless of shareholders' wishes. Indeed, in a proper case the courts will entertain an action
by a minority shareholder to compel the directors to apply for dissolution.40
The law as to what occurs once the court takes jurisdiction is well defined
in both situations. Thus, in the writer's view, the emphasis of the majority
in the Benintendi case on the possibility of deadlock, as an objection to sustaining by-law number 1 because it might prevent dissolution when that was
appropriate, is overdrawn.
41N.
2

Y. PARTNERSH P LAW §§ 60 et seq.
4 Id. at § 62 (d).

431d. at § 62 (2).
441d. at § 63 (c).
451d.
at § 63 (d).
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OKroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1931); Gottfried v.
Grottfried, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 951 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; and see Jameson v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 14 App. Div. 380, 385, 44 N. Y. Supp. 15, 17 (1879).
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The new statute will not substantially affect this situation. It will now
be possible to require unanimity or qualified majority for shareholders' or
directors' action to dissolve, but as the Law Revision Commission points
out in its Recommendation 47 the right of the minority shareholder to seek
to compel the board to act will not be affected. Thus as to either the partnership oi the close corporation a court of equity remains in the position to
apply the drastic remedy of dissolution when in its judgment a deadlock is
causing injury to the enterprise.
The Scope of the New Statute
The new statute in effect writes into the New York scheme the provision
of the Illinois Business Corporation Act permitting requirements of unanimity
or qualified majority for directors' action, 48 and that of the Delaware Corporation Law permitting such requirements for shareholders' action,49 subject
to four safeguards;
1. The requirements must appear in the certificate of incorporation;
2. Notice of the existence of the requirements must appear plainly on
the face or back of all 'share certificates;
3. The requirements can be imposed only by unanimous consent; and
4. They are valid only for a specified period not exceeding ten years,
with rights of renewal.
The Commission's comments on its reasons for these safeguards are
illuminating. Thus as to 1 and 3, the Commission says:
"This makes certain that there will be a public record of the requirement and of its terms, and implements (through operation of the existing
provisions for amendment of a certificate of incorporation) the method
by which it may be changed." 50
As to 2:
"Presumably this would be done in the manner in which a restriction
on transfer of shares is now noted on the certificate as required by
Personal Property Law, section 176 (Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
§ 15)." 5 '
And as to 4:
"Thus, the participants in a close corporation who may wish to take
47
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Doc. (1948) No. 65K, pp. 7-8.

SILL. Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.37.
DE.L. CoRp. LAW §§ 2 (5) and 17.
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LEG. Doc. (1948) No. 65K, p. 7.
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advantage of the amendment would not be permitted to bind themselves
irrevocably and in perpetuity. The ten-year maximum was selected in
analogy to section 50 of the Stock Corporation Law, which limits a voting
trust to ten years. The analogy to a partnership agreement, which almost
uniformly has a limited term of years but may carry on thereafter from
52
year to year until a partner serves notice of termination, is obvious."
The Preseni Status
A review of our discussion in the light of the safeguards of the new statute,
and the Commission's comments on them, may be useful. How will existing
practise, particularly the provisions of shareholders' agreements, be affected?
How far does the new statute go toward balancing the equation between
partnership and close corporation?
The typical shareholders'- agreement has three purposes:
I. To embody the shareholders' arrangements as to the capital structure,
investments and distribution of shares. Often it serves as an agreement
to subscribe for shares when issued. When organization is complete
and the shares issued and paid for, this function of the agreement is
executed. In this aspect, the new statute does not impinge upon the
agreement.
II. To embody the restriction on transfer and cross-option agreement.
This can be done as well by provision of the certificate of incorporation or by by-law, but it has more usually been included in the
shareholders' agreement for fear that otherwise a,simple majority
would be able to amend it. Indeed under the cases discussed above
53
such fears would seem well founded.
Where the unanimity requirement of the new statute can be met,
the sole issue as to whether the restriction on transfer and cross-option
agreement should still be included in a shareholders' agreement, rather
than in the certificate of incorporation, would seem to be that of its
duration. If it is desired that it endure for longer than the ten-year
period it must still be embodied in a shareholders' agreement, because
a provision forbidding amendment of the certificate of incorporation
except upon unanimous or qualified majority consent of shareholders
included in the certificate of incorporation under the new statute would
not be effective beyond ten years unless renewed.
52lbid.
53
However, by-law number 4 requiring unanimity for amendment of the by-laws of
Kenton Hotel, Inc., was sustained.
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III. To create veto powers of the various types discussed above.
It is in this aspect that the greatest change in practise resulting
from the new statute will probably occur. Looking back at our discussion of the various types of veto powers sought and the devices
used for obtaining them, practically all such devices may depend or
can be made to depend for their effectiveness in particular situations
on provisions requiring unanimity or qualified majority for shareholders' or directors' action or both, either generally or as to specified
matters.
The statute contains a saving clause, preserving the validity (if under the
decided cases they were valid) of existing certificate provisions, by-laws or
agreements, and condemns only such veto powers as depend on Section 9
itself for their validity if it be attempted to impose 'them without compliance
with the statute. Theoretically, therefore, there remains an area in which
counsel, in reliance on Clark v. Dodge, might prefer a shareholder's agreement requiring the employment of X at a stated salary for life and during
good behavior to a requirement for unanimous directors' action to remove
any officer, or specifically the president, for a ten-year period. Since neither
the Benintendi nor the Long Park case specifically overruled Clark v. Dodge,
reliance on it may still be justified. Other cases, however, will not be half
so clear, and in the writer's view the courts will probably tend toward strict
construction of agreements entered into after September 1, 1948; and thus
toward a holding that even the agreement to employ X for life and during
good behavior depends on the new statute for its validity and thus should
be struck down unless arrived at by indirection under the new statute.
An agreement that the participants will vote for each other as directors
is still unobjectionable, though possibly a weak reed, as indicated above.
More important is the power to remove a director, or to change the number
of the board. Provisions of shareholders' agreements forbidding removal
or change by statutory majority are probably invalid under the new statute
because they appear elsewhere than in the certificate of incorporation.
Employment contracts, properly drawn, remain effective to protect the
employee-shareholder against termination o f his employment or diminution
of his salary during the contract period, but not against removal from elective
office. Clearly a provision in a shareholders' agreement which attempts to
give added protection by requiring unanimity or qualified majority of the
board to remove an officer would be invalid under the new statute. On the
other hand, once the original election to office and employment at an agreed
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salary are accomplished, reliance can be placed on a provision of the certificate of incorporation, adopted in accordance with the new statute, requiring unanimity or qualified majority for removal from office or for any
change of an executive salary. Even though the officers are elected to serve
"at the pleasure of the board" 54 and not for any fixed term, the protection
would seem to be complete for the permitted statutory period.
As to extraordinary shareholders' action, the new statute, where it can
be complied with, would seem to dispense with the necessity for the relatively
complicated classification of shares or voting trust, and removes any vestige
of doubt as to the validity of requiring more than a statutory majority of a
single class of shares to vote or consent on a particular matter. Here again,
inclusion of such requirements in a shareholders' agreement may henceforth
be ineffective.
The dissolution cases cited above serve to emphasize one basic point: No
scheme, however well conceived and skillfully executed, will suffice to protect
any individual who commits a fraud or acts in bad faith toward his coparticipants. Th-e factual burden of proof that the removal of an officer was
for good cause, or that the nonfeasance of a shareholder-executive is actually
injuring the business, may be difficult to meet, but once it is met the broad
powers of equity can work out a fair result.
To sum up, whethe- the new statute will dispense with the necessity for
a shareholders' agreement must be decided on the facts of the particular
situation. Clearly it does not dispense with the necessity of thinking the
problem through in the light of the various capacities-shareholders, directors,
officers, employees-in which the participants will be acting. Respect for
the statutoi-y hierarchy remains essential to the skilled and effective counselling of the participants in a close corporation. The new statute does provide
a method, exclusive in the area of directors' action, of setting up the veto
powers which the participants in close corporations usually desire to accomplish their objective of equation to the partnership set-up. It seeks to safeguard the potential innocent purchaser of shares by providing that notice of
the existence of a certificate provision inserted under the new statute shall
appear "plainly on the face or back of all stock certificates." This statutory
notice cannot be buried in a small type text of "designations, preferences,
privileges and voting powers." Probably it requires as large a type as the
main body of the certificate and perhaps also separation from it. The writer
would suggest that a legend typed or stamped across the face or in an other4
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wise blank space, combining this notice with the restriction on transfer,
would probably be effective. The following is a suggested form:
"Transfer of these shares is restricted pursuant to agreement dated
......
19.. ; and pursuant to Section 9 of the Stock Corporation
Law, the certificate of incorporation contains provisions requiring a
majority (or plurality) greater than that prescribed by law for a
(quorum) . (vote) (or consent) of (directors) (or shareholders). A
copy of said agreement and of the certificate of incorporation are on
file at the office of the corporation."
,.

If it is desired to make assurance doubly sure, either of the following
texts could be inserted before the last sentence:
A. "to which the rights and interests of the holders of this certificate are
subject, and to which such holder, by his acceptance hereof, specifically
consents" ; or
B. "which by this reference are made a part hereof with the same force
and effect as if herein set forth at length."
Unquestionably the new statute has narrowed the gap in the equation
between the close corporation and the partnership. It is still not possible
to reach the desired result in all instances by the direct route-an affirmative
agreement between the participants binding upon them in all of their various
capacities. It has become possible to reach it in almost every instance by
careful analysis of the factual situation, based upon which requirements for
unanimity or qualified majority may be imposed either generally or as to
specific matters. Our statutes still fail specifically to recognize the close
corporation as a separate concept. Yet there can be no doubt that the new
statute would be of little practical use to a public issue corporation. Indeed
a public issue corporation which attempted to use the statute would probably
have difficulty in finding an underwriter for its securities. Practically, therefore, the new statute has made available to the genuine close corporation a
clear, if technical, path toward equation with the fixed term partnership, and
thus has lessened the likelihood that changed circumstances, unforeseen and
perhaps unforseeable 'at organization, will cripple the smooth functioning
of a profitable business.

